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Theoretical
Work
Lay
Analysis
In Austria
in Freud's day to treat patients without having earned a medical
degree constituted quackery and warranted punishment by law.
Theodor Reik, a lawyer by training, had studied with Freud
and was a practicing member of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical
Society in 1926 when, at the instigation of a former analysand,
he was prosecuted under this charge. Reik was exonerated eventually,
but not until a number of expert witnesses had testified on
his behalf, and Freud himself, having discussed the case with
a high official, "had, at his request, written a confidential
opinion on the subject."
Later
that year, in The Question of Lay Analysis, Freud made public
this opinion in the rhetorical form of "Conversations within
an Impartial Person." There he summarized the prevailing argument
against lay analysis as follows: "Neurotics are patients,
laymen are non-doctors, psychoanalysis is a procedure for
curing or improving nervous disorders, and all such treatments
are reserved to doctors. It follows that laymen are not allowed
to practice analysis on neurotics and are punishable if they
nevertheless do so." Freud did not oppose this reasoning,
but disagreed with its major premises, arguing "that in this
instance the patients are not like other patients, that the
laymen are not really laymen, and that . . . doctors have
not exactly the qualities which one has a right to expect
of doctors and on which their claims should be based."
Freud
began his discussion by noting that neurotic patients present
medical-like complaints for which medical doctors can find
no organic cause. He reviewed for his "Impartial Person" the
psychoanalytic model of the mind and the psychodynamic theory
of neurosis, concluding that neurotics are not like other
patients because they suffer disturbances, not in the medical
province of the body, but in the separate and sovereign domain
of the psyche. They differ, too, he said, because they act
as if driven by a (most un-patient-like) desire to remain
ill (see Repetition Compulsion). Freud went on to show that,
for these patients, the lay analyst is not really a layman
because analytic training, by way of didactics, personal analysis,
and clinical supervision, brings the analyst to proficiency
in this form of therapy. Medical training, by contrast, not
only omits such instruction, but entirely overlooks "the mental
side of vital phenomena." Worst of all, said Freud, orthodox
medicine with its one-sided emphasis on objective science
inculcates "a false and detrimental attitude" toward neurotic
patients: the notion that, because their suffering is merely
psychic, for medical purposes it is not real. He continues:
"Only psychiatry is supposed to deal with the disturbances
of mental functions; but we know in what manner and with what
aims it does so. It looks for-the somatic determinants of
mental disorders and treats them like other causes of illness."
Thus without
addressing it directly, Freud pointed to the split in our
thinking about ourselves that divides the mind from the body
and seems to necessitate separate approaches to the sufferings
of the body and of the soul. While human suffering in fact
defies this split, human attitudes reify it again and again.
Psychoanalysis, which arose in part as an effort to redress
the problems of this dualism, itself often divides along mind/body
lines. Thus the field finds itself perennially plagued by
controversies over the primacy of either the subjective or
the objective domain of clinical theory and procedure-- for
example, whether it is "fantasy" or "what really happened"
that ultimately explains the genesis of psychological symptoms,
or whether "transference" or "the real relationship" offers
the solider foundation for therapeutic change.
Acknowledging
the limits of the medical science of his day, Freud ended
his essay on an optimistic note. Someday, he wrote, "the paths
of knowledge and, let us hope, of influence will be opened
up leading from organic biology and chemistry to the field
of neurotic phenomena. That day still seems a distant one,
and for the present these illnesses are inaccessible to us
from the direction of medicine." Until that time, he argued,
the diagnosis and treatment of neurotic suffering would remain
a province far enough removed from mainstream medicine to
call for its own specialized and non-medical treatment profession.
Toward that end, he proposed that neurotic patients should
be screened by physicians for recognizable signs of organic
illness, then referred for treatment in the hands of "secular
pastoral workers" trained in psychoanalysis. "A new kind of
Salvation Army!", his Impartial Person quipped. "Why not?"
was Freud's reply.
The question
of lay practice divides psychoanalysis to this day. The arguments
for and against it remain essentially unchanged. Despite Freud's
optimism, it seems, psychoanalysis has become no more scientific,
nor science more psychoanalytic, through the passage of these
seventy-and-more years.
References
Eissler,
K.R. (1965). Medical Orthodoxy and the Future of Psychoanalysis.
N.Y.: International Universities Press.
Freud,
S. (1926). The Question at Lay Analysis. S.E. 20: 179-258.
Mann,
D.W. (1988). The question of medical psychotherapy. American
Journal of Psychotherapy, 43: 405-413. [Various Authors].
(1927).
International Journal of Psychoanalysis 8, Part 2 : 174-283.
David
Mann
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